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ABSTRACT
 
We contribute to the debate over whether forecastable stock returns reflect an 
unexploited profit opportunity or rationally reflect risk differentials. We test whether 
agents could earn excess returns by selecting stocks which have a low market price 
compared to an estimate of the fundamental value obtained from the present value 
model. The criterion for stock picking is one which could actually have been 
implemented by agents in real time. We show that statistically significant, and 
quantitatively substantial, excess returns are delivered by portfolios of stocks which 
are cheap relative to our estimate of fundamental value. There is no evidence that the 
under priced stocks are relatively risky and hence excess returns cannot easily be 
interpreted as an equilibrium compensation for risk. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
It is now widely accepted that cross-section stock returns can be forecast by the ratio 
of the current stock price to a number of accounting variables such as the ratio of the 
market value to book value of assets, Fama and French (1992), the price dividend 
ratio, Elton et al. (1983) and the ratio of cash flow to market value of equity, 
Lakonishok et al. (1994). Even the well known size effect, Banz (1981), falls into this 
class, since size is usually measured by stock price multiplied by the number of 
outstanding shares. We examine whether the evidence that price scaled accounting 
measures can forecast returns indicates a genuine profit opportunity or instead 
rationally reflects risk differences between stocks. 
 
This latter interpretation follows from the fact that risky stocks, which offer higher 
expected returns, inevitably have relatively low market prices relative to accounting 
variables like book value, current dividends, current earnings and the number of 
outstanding shares.3 The interpretation that forecastable returns represent an economic 
profit opportunity follows from the hypothesis that there are irrational swings in 
market sentiment, see Shiller (1989). Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that current 
accounting variables serve as a proxy for fundamental value and hence we can 
identify under priced stocks as those with a low price relative to these variables. They 
present evidence to suggest that this is why these price scaled variables have 
forecasting power.  
 
These very different theories of stock pricing imply the same empirical relationships 
in the data because current price is measured relative to a proxy for the fundamental 
                                                 
3 For the price dividend ratio this follows from the Gordon growth model. Berk (1996) demonstrates 
that in an efficient market size and market to book will be risk proxies and hence will forecast returns.  
which is independent of company risk. It is inevitable in this approach that risky firms 
will on average appear relatively under priced. In this paper we attempt to overcome 
the problem of observational equivalence by constructing an estimate of the 
fundamental value which reflects the risk of the stock. We test whether returns can be 
forecast by the ratio of current price to an estimate of the fundamental value for the 
stock price calculated from a model which implicitly allows for risk. So risky stocks 
need not have a low market price relative to this benchmark and therefore if under 
priced stocks are found to deliver high returns this cannot so easily be explained away 
as an equilibrium compensation for risk. 
 
The fundamental value for a stock is estimated as follows. We assume that the 
dividend process for individual firms is stationary in first differences. The present 
value model then implies that prices and dividends are co-integrated, Campbell and 
Shiller (1987). We estimate the parameters of this co-integrating regression for each 
firm in our sample. Our estimate of the fundamental stock price at any date is then 
obtained by substituting the stock’s current dividend into the estimated co-integrating 
regression.4 The stock’s risk premium is reflected in our measure of fundamental 
value because stocks with high required rates of return will, on average, have a low 
price relative to their dividend. Thus our estimate of the fundamental value will reflect 
the risk adjusted discount rate which the market is actually observed to apply to each 
stock over the sample period. We assume that however risk is measured and priced, 
the relative risk of a company is fixed within the sample period.5  
                                                 
4 This approach may be compared to the conventional current dividend yield criterion. This latter 
approach tests for excess returns on portfolios of stocks which have a high dividend yield relative to 
other stocks at the same date. Our approach will tend to select stocks which have a high yield not 
relative to other stocks but relative to their own past dividend yield.  
5 It is possible for both the risk free rate and the average equity risk premium to be time varying, since 
these aggregate fluctuations will not affect the relative ranking of stocks using our mispricing measure. 
 To ensure that the explanatory variables are public information at the beginning of the 
period over which returns are forecast, we use a measure of fundamental value 
obtained from a co-integrating regression which is estimated using only the data 
available up to that same date that the forecast is made. In this way we are testing for 
the existence of a profitable trading rule which could have been employed by agents 
trading in real time. 
  
We work with a sample of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and test 
whether portfolios of the “under priced” stocks selected on the above criterion deliver 
excess returns over a one to ten year time horizon. This allows us to study the whole 
life cycle of mispricing and thus relate our results to the evidence of negative serial 
correlation in long term returns reported by Debondt and Thaler (1985). We first 
compare the absolute size of returns over one to ten years on portfolios of stocks 
which are over priced to returns on portfolios of under priced stocks. Finding a 
substantial difference in the size of the realized returns on these portfolios we next 
report tests of statistical significance. We evaluate the statistical significance of the 
out-performance of the under priced stocks. Finally, and notwithstanding the above 
arguments that our benchmark ratio should not be correlated with risk, we examine 
whether there is any evidence that the profits which the stock picking criterion 
delivers can be explained away by differences in risk. 
 
In Section 2 we discuss our an estimate of the fundamental value of individual firms. 
Next we describe the data and report our results, and in Section 4 examine whether 
the excess returns which we find may simply reflect increased risk. 
 2 AN ESTIMATE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF STOCKS 
 
The fundamental value for firm i  at date , , is the expected value of future 
dividends, , discounted by the firm specific rate 
t *,tiP
jtiD +, iδ . Suppressing the i  subscript:  
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where [ ]δδ −=Θ 1 ,  is the constant in the cointegrating regression, and the 
third term on the right hand side of (2) is a stationary residual. The cointegrating 
vector for each firm, 
µ2Θ
[ ]ΘΘ− ,,1 2µ , reflects both the firm specific discount rate, δ , and 
its long term dividend growth rate. This ensures that when we calculate our estimate 
of the fundamental appropriate allowance for risk is made. 
 
We estimate (2) at each date when we wish to calculate a fundamental value using 
only price and dividend data up to and including that same date. This allows us to test 
whether stocks are mispriced conditional on the information sets of agents who do not 
know the true parameters of the model, but have to estimate them from public data 
which is available at the date when the fundamental value must be calculated. Our 
estimate of the fundamental value of a stock, , is then obtained by substituting the 
current dividend into the co-integrating relationship estimated at that date: we 
calculate , where the subscripts  indicate a parameter 
estimated at date t for stock i. 
tiP ,ˆ
tititititi DP ,
2
,,,, ˆˆˆˆ µΘ+Θ= ti,
 
In an efficient market price may differ from the co-integrating price as a consequence 
of rationally forecast temporary differences between dividend growth in the short run 
and its long run value, as captured by the third term on the right hand side of (2). But 
this difference is public information and hence cannot forecast returns. Under the 
alternative hypothesis a fad arises as an additional term on the right hand side of (2). 
The ratio of market price to cointegrating price will then be a measure of stock 
mispricing and hence should forecast returns if mispricing is temporary.    
 
3 DATA AND RESULTS 
 
Data on prices, dividends, Beta, and size were taken from CRSP (Centre for Research 
in Security Prices, University of Chicago). The dividend yield is measured by total 
annual dividend payments in the calendar year ending December 31st divided by the 
stock price on December 31st. Size is market capitalisation. The cointegrating 
regressions are estimated using a price and dividend series for each stock which are 
adjusted for all forms of capital re-organisations, using data provided by CRSP. The 
sample of firms studied in any year is all those which have been continuously listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange from December 1945 to that same date and paid 
dividends in at least 10 of those years.6 The sample consists of 580 firms in 1960, 
which falls to 348 in 1980. 
 
In view of the large number of firms, and data sets of different spans, we do not report 
the time series properties of the individual dividend series, or results for the 
cointegrating regressions. The assumption that for the typical firm dividends are first 
difference stationary and that prices and dividends are cointegrated is a necessary 
condition for our procedure to successfully identify under priced stocks on average. 
We will, of course, make mistakes in identifying under priced stocks and one reason 
for this may be that these assumptions are false for some firms. The critical issue is 
whether there is systematic mispricing which can be identified by a strategy which 
requires these assumptions to be satisfied for the average firm. 
 
We measure mispricing by the ratio of current market price to estimated fundamental 
price. All stocks are ranked by this ratio each year and then are assigned to Decile 
portfolios. The top and bottom Deciles are sub-divided into two. All firms in a 
particular portfolio are initially given equal weighting and thereafter there is no 
rebalancing of portfolios. Cumulative real portfolio returns for individual portfolios 
are calculated assuming that dividends are re-invested in the same stock. Cumulative 
portfolio returns are the average of the cumulative returns for individual stocks. There 
is no problem of survivorship bias since we trace returns on all firms irrespective of 
                                                 
6 This sample choice reflects a trade-off between the number of firms included and the length of data 
available on each to estimate the co-integrating regression.  We chose to begin after World War II as a 
“natural” definition of the sample to avoid any suspicion that the results were obtained by data mining.  
their survival history after the sample selection year. Where firms disappear from the 
data set for any reason we assume final payments to stockholders are reinvested in the 
same portfolio in the same proportions as the remaining firms occupy at that date. 
 
We first report returns on five portfolios consisting of the full sample of firms, FS, the 
5% most under-valued firms, UN1; the next 5% most under-valued firms, UN2; the 
5% most over-valued firms, OV1 and the next 5% most over-valued, OV2. Portfolios 
are constructed starting from December 31st 1960 and then annually on the same date 
until December 31st 1982. For each start date, the returns on portfolios were 
calculated for the subsequent decade. Table 1 reports the average returns across start 
dates of these portfolios for horizons of one to ten years. 
  
In Table 1 it can be seen that on average UN1 and UN2 portfolios both beat the full 
sample for all horizons. UN1 also beats UN2 for all horizons. The expected excess 
returns are substantial. For example, the UN1 portfolio delivers an average 
cumulative excess return of 36.1% over five years, compared to the full sample. The 
UN1 portfolio betas the OV1 portfolio on average by 45.7% cumulative over 5 years, 
or approximately 9% per annum for 5 consecutive years. Both of the over-valued 
portfolios, OV1 and OV2, on average under-perform the full sample average for all 
horizons, except the first year in the case of OV1. The one somewhat surprising result 
is that OV1 delivers higher returns than OV2 for the first six years.7
 
                                                 
7 This is because the most over-valued portfolio contained a number of zero dividend firms. Repeating 
the whole exercise omitting any firms which paid no dividends in the twelve months preceding the date 
of portfolio formation overturns this result. It is often argued that zero dividends are a sign of financial 
distress so that the well documented fact that zero dividend firms deliver higher returns can be 
explained as a risk premium, Christie (1990). 
Tracing returns for a decade contributes evidence on the long-run life cycle of 
mispricing and allows us to relate our results to the work which has reported negative 
serial correlation in long run returns, for example DeBondt and Thaler (1985). In 
order to focus on the life cycle of return we report in Table 2 the average incremental 
returns from holding each portfolio for one more year. The evidence in Table 2 is 
consistent with, but suggests a qualification to, the evidence reported by DeBondt and 
Thaler that performance over a five year horizon is negatively correlated with 
subsequent returns. It is consistent in that an over-valued stock must have previously 
delivered high returns in the course of becoming over-valued and in this case high 
past returns will be followed by low subsequent returns. However, high returns which 
are a result of the unwinding of earlier under pricing are not followed by unusually 
low returns. An undervalued portfolio, which consistently delivers substantial excess 
returns over a five year horizon, performs marginally better than the full sample over 
the following five years, with a small cumulative excess return of only 4.9%. Five 
years over performance is followed by five years of approximately average returns. 
This implies that the underlying factor which explains excess returns is not under-
performance in the past but under pricing in the present. Past underperformance is an 
imperfect proxy for current under valuation. 
 
Table 2 also highlights an interesting asymmetry in the time profile of the excess 
returns for under and over valued portfolios. The UN1 portfolio delivers a cumulative 
excess return of 31.6% over the first five years. On the other hand the 5% most over-
valued portfolio, OV1, only under-performs in the first five years by a cumulative 
9.6%. However, in the second half of the decade it underperforms the full sample by a 
cumulative 30.3%, with particularly pronounced under-performance in the last three 
years of the decade. This suggests that under-valued shares bounce back to 
fundamental values more quickly than glamour stocks are exposed for their true 
worth. The market spots a bargain quicker than it loses faith in a favourite.8
 
On our best estimate it is possible to earn substantial profits using this trading rule. 
We turn next to the question of whether these profits are statistically significant. We 
regress returns on the ration of market price to the theoretical stock price. We argued 
above that this ration should not be correlated with the risk of the stock providing the 
firm risk is constant over time. If this assumption is valid then a properly specified 
returns regression requires that we also include regressors which do explicitly capture 
risk. We use three variables to measure risk, Beta, size and dividend yield. Under the 
CAPM covariance with the market, i.e. Beta, measures risk. Fama and French (1992), 
and others, show that market capitalisation is important in explaining cross-section 
returns. Berk (1995) shows why size will serve as a risk measure. Finally , Ball (1978) 
argued that dividend yield should serve as a catch all measure of risk in an efficient 
market. Even if the researcher has not assumed the correct model of risk pricing then 
the variance of total returns due to risk will be proxied by the dividend yield, since the 
dividend yield is a component of the total return.9 This gives the specification of our 
cross-section regression, estimated at date t: 
 
( ) titititititititi uPDSizeBetaPPR ,,,4,3,2,,10, ˆlog +++++= γγγγγ   (3) 
 
                                                 
8 Moreover, the average probability of a company which was in OV1 one year re-appearing in OV1 the 
following year was 53.8%. The average probability of a UN1 company re-appearing the following year 
was 43.5%. Mispricing is highly persistent, both for over and under-valued firms. However, the 
persistence of over valuation is rather greater than that of under valuation. This is consistent with the 
evidence in Table 2. 
9 The only assumption required for this argument is that if dividends are paid on stock then the fraction 
of total returns which are delivered by dividends is not itself systematically related to risk. 
The null hypothesis of efficient markets implies that 01 =γ : deviations of market 
price from the theoretical price reflect expected temporary deviations in the dividend 
growth rate from its long run average and are uncorrelated with subsequent returns.  
 
Since firms are drawn from single economy we would expect a macro component to 
unexpected returns common to all firms at a single date, so ‘t’ statistic from the cross-
section regression (3) will be biased because we would not expect ( ) 0,cov ≠ji uu , 
. We follow Fama and Mcbeth (1973) (FM) proposed solution to this problem 
which recognises that the estimates of the coefficients themselves are not biased, 
despite the presence of cross-section dependence in the error term. Therefore 
regression (3) is estimated for t periods and the sample distribution of 
ji ≠
kγˆ  is 
constructed for each coefficient, 4,...0=k . The sample standard deviation of the 
estimated coefficients provides an estimate of the standard error of the distribution of  
kγ . We then have the ‘t’ statistic ( ) kkkt γσγγ ˆˆˆ =  for  = 0,…4, where 
 and 
k
∑=−= Tt tkk T 1 ,1 ˆˆ γγ ( ) ( )∑ = −−= Tt ktkTk 1 2,22 ˆˆ1ˆ γγσ γ and T is the number of estimated 
cross-section regressions. A disadvantage of this approach is that we cannot study 
long horizon returns, as FM estimation requires non-overlapping data. In order to run 
a reasonable number of independent cross-section regressions we only consider 
returns for horizons of up to three years. We retain the same start date, 1960. The 
cross-section regression is estimated each year 1960-91 for one year returns; every 
second year 1960-1990 for two year returns and every three years 1960-1989 for three 
year returns. This gave 15 two year horizon regression and 10 three year horizon 
regressions. We report the results in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 shows that for return horizons of two and three years we can reject the 
implication of the efficient markets hypothesis that  01 =γ . The signs and ‘t’ statistics 
on the remaining variables are all largely in line with results obtained in previous 
research. The size variable is significant and of the expected sign in our sample. The 
dividend yield coefficient is of the expected sign for most periods. Although it is not 
statistically significant, we do not attach any importance to this in view of the few 
years available from which to calculate the ‘t’ statistic. For the same reason, the 
positive, but only marginally significant coefficient on Beta is unsurprising. The fact 
that we could run so few regressions to build up the sample distribution of the 
coefficients in the case of two and three year returns implies that our best test had low 
power to reject the null hypothesis. It is therefore the more striking that we were able 
to do so. It is interesting to compare the ‘t’ statistic on our mispricing variable with 
the evidence which our test delivers on the role of size. It is widely accepted that size 
is an important determinant of returns over this same time period, Fama and French 
(1992). However, the ‘t’ statistic on size in ours test is still smaller than that on the 
mispricing variable for both two and three year returns. 
 
4. IS OUR CRITERION SIMPLY SELECTING RISKIER STOCKS? 
 
The excess returns on the under priced portfolios appear to be large and statistically 
significant. However, it might yet be argued that the above assumption, that firms’ 
perceived relative risk at any time is the historic average up to that date in the sample, 
is invalid. In this case stocks which are of temporarily high risk will appear 
underpriced. One answer to this is that in the above regression we controlled for risk 
using the contemporaneously measured size and dividend yield and Beta measured 
over the previous five years. Another perspective is provided by looking at the 
average value of size and Beta for the under and over-valued portfolios, and these 
statistics are reported in Table 4. 
 
It can be seen in Table 4 that although the average value of Beta for the 5% most 
under-valued portfolio is larger than for the 5% most over-valued, the size of the 
difference is bot large enough to account for all the excess return. If the equity 
premium over the safe rate of interest is taken to be the historic average of 
approximately 8%, then the difference in Beta between UN1 and OV1 requires a yield 
difference of approximately 9% per annum over the first five years. Furthermore the 
average value of Beta for UN2 is less than for OV1, and yet on average for every 
horizon UN2 beats OV1.  
 
The average company size in both of the under-valued portfolios is greater than in 
both of the over-valued portfolios. Since there is overwhelming evidence, Banz 
(1981), Fama and French (1992), that on average smaller firms deliver higher returns 
it is striking that UN1 and UN2 both beat OV1 and OV2 despite the fact that the latter 
are comprised on average of significantly smaller firms. 
 
However many measures of risk we report it can still be argued that excess returns 
may be rationalised by some other model of risk. An alternative approach is to not 
focus on ex ante risk measures but to examine instead whether as a matter of fact the 
under priced shares were, when combined into portfolios, riskier ex post. That is, 
rather than comparing just the mean of the resulting returns distribution for under 
priced / over priced portfolios, as in the previous section we compare the whole 
distributions. We report results on the distribution of five year returns in Table 5. 
 
We examine whether a risk-averse individual would strictly prefer the distribution of 
returns from the under priced portfolio to the distribution of returns from the over 
priced portfolio. We use the criterion of second order stochastic dominance (SSD). A 
probability density function, , is said to exhibit SSD over a density if  
,  with strict inequality for some , where  denote 
cumulative density functions associated with density functions and 
f g
( ) ( )∫ ∫≤ya ya dxxGdxxF y∀ y GF ,
f g  respectively. 
If  exhibits SSD with respect to f g , then  is preferred to f g  by all risk averters, 
see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1972). 
 
We find that the Decile of most under-valued shares exhibited second order stochastic 
dominance over the Decile portfolio of most over-valued shares. Indeed the under 
valued stocks only fail to exhibit first order stochastic dominance by a tiny margin. 
Table 5 reveals that for every start date the five year returns of the most under-valued 
Decile were greater than the five year returns on the most over-valued Decile, with 
the trivial exception of 1964 where the cumulative difference between the two was 
0.3% over 5 years. To interpret the dominance of our under priced portfolios over five 
years as consistent with rational asset pricing one would have to argue that the excess 
return on the under priced stocks reflected a stronger positive covariance with shocks 
to aggregate wealth of a kind that was not observed in over thirty years. 
 
Finally, consider the relative protection offered by the under and over priced 
portfolios to crashes. The largest annual fall in our sample, with average twelve 
month returns of -29.7%, was in 1974. In all cases which overlap this period the most 
under valued portfolio 5 year returns still beat the most over valued portfolio. The 
under priced portfolio bought in December 1969 lost, by the end of 1974, 54.2% 
against a loss of  49.7% on the corresponding over priced portfolio. 
 
We conclude that it seems hard to account for the profits delivered by the trading rule 
as equilibrium rewards to holding riskier stocks. 
 
V Summary and Conclusions 
 
We found support for the hypothesis that there is a component of forecastable stock 
returns which is driven by irrational swings in market sentiment. We employed a 
number of distinct approaches to the question of whether the returns forecastability 
we uncovered could be rationalised as an equilibrium reward to risk. Firstly, we 
worked with a benchmark price ratio which did not imply that risky shares would 
necessarily appear under priced, unlike those price scaled accounting variables which 
have previously been shown to forecast returns. Secondly we used a number of 
approaches to evaluate whether the portfolios of stocks which appear under priced 
were more risky. Each approach gave the same negative answer. This evidence 
suggests that one would have to have a very strong prior belief in efficient markets to 
argue that the stock picking rule we have used does not generate economic profits.  
 
Our results provide a framework in which the evidence for negative serial correlation 
in long run returns reported by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) can be interpreted. 
Undervalued stocks must have delivered negative returns in the course of becoming 
undervalued and hence the use of past returns will be a proxy for a direct measure of 
current mispricing. However, it is an imperfect proxy since we showed that excess 
returns which resulted from an unravelling of earlier mispricing were not correlated 
with subsequent returns. 
 
An interesting extension of this work would be to try to find variables to explain the 
mispricing of equities as measured by titi PP ,,ˆ   
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Table 1. Average Cumulative Portfolio Returns Expressed as Percentage. 
Holding 
Period, yrs 
Full Sample 
FS 
UN1 UN2 OV2 OV1 
      
1 9.7 15.3 11.9 7.5 9.9 
2 18.9 32.1 26.1 12.1 15.2 
3 29.1 46.9 37.1 18.3 22.2 
4 41.1 69.0 51.3 25.5 31.7 
5 559 92.0 69.9 38.5 46.3 
6 70.0 108.2 85.5 51.2 58.4 
7 86.6 130.0 104.6 67.5 67.4 
8 100.4 154.9 124.5 76.8 69.3 
9 114.8 178.1 148.4 86.6 70.5 
10 133.4 197.0 175.3 96.9 74.7 
 
Table 2. Average Incremental Portfolio Returns Expressed as Percentage 
Holding 
Period yrs 
Full Sample 
FS 
UN1 UN2 OV2 OV1 
      
1 9.7 15.3 11.9 7.5 9.9 
2 8.4 14.6 12.7 4.3 4.8 
3 8.6 11.2 8.2 5.5 6.1 
4 9.3 15.0 10.4 6.1 7.7 
5 10.5 13.6 12.3 10.4 11.1 
6 9.1 8.4 9.2 9.2 8.3 
7 9.8 10.5 10.3 10.8 5.7 
8 7.6 10.8 9.7 5.6 1.1 
9 7.2 9.1 10.6 5.5 0.7 
10 8.7 6.7 10.8 5.5 2.5 
 
Table 3. Averaged Coefficients for Returns Regressions 
( ) titititititititi uPDSizeBetaPPR ,,,4,3,2,,10, ˆlog +++++= γγγγγ  
Return 
Horizon, yrs 
0γ  1γ  2γ  3γ  4γ  
      
1 0.049  
(1.76)  
-0.003 
(-0.34) 
0.059 
(1.60) 
-0.016 
(-2.25) 
0.048 
(0.21) 
2 0.156 
(2.74) 
-0.053 
(-2.58) 
0.038 
(0.66) 
-0.030 
(-1.99) 
-0.110 
(-0.17) 
3 0.226 
(3.71) 
-0.106 
(-2.39) 
0.045 
(0.94) 
-0.037 
(-1.45) 
0.623 
(1.05) 
 
Table 4 Average Value of Beta and Company Size 
 Full Sample UN1 UN2 OV2 OV1 
      
Beta 1.17 1.46 1.25 1.2 1.29 
Size 21,072 15,427 17,636 15,000 9,960 
 
 
 
Table 5. Five Year Returns on Decile Portfolios Ranked by titi PP ,, ˆ  
Start 
Date 
Most 
Under-
valued 
Decile 
        Most 
Over-
valued 
Decile 
           
1960 177.0 116.0 134.2 101.9 103.3 100.0 97.8 86.3 90.3 92.8 
1961 51.9 59.9 59.1 40.0 38.3 35.1 37.0 37.3 54.0 32.3 
1962 184.2 130.9 138.5 117.7 114.7 133.6 115.6 103.4 115.5 150.9 
1963 171.2 151.4 116.6 86.6 107.0 133.9 153.9 133.2 163.2 154.6 
1964 70.2 63.6 36.6 57.2 46.9 32.6 61.3 62.1 81.7 70.5 
1965 26.2 15.9 13.5 16.4 34.9 19.4 54.1 5.6 7.9 0.4 
1966 86.8 47.8 50.0 44.8 61.2 67.4 47.3 28.0 64.1 28.9 
1967 14.1 32.2 23.8 27.0 20.7 18.7 8.4 15.0 5.9 -21.7 
1968 -24.3 -15.9 -21.6 -15.5 -17.1 -37.8 -16.3 -32.6 -39.2 -51.4 
1969 -34.2 -34.7 -33.7 -31.4 -34.7 -33.7 -24.0 -36.5 -56.1 -49.7 
1970 -6.8 -11.4 -17.8 -7.9 -19.3 -16.4 -12.6 -11.7 -14.6 -8.3 
1971 16.5 0.6 10.1 11.9 5.2 -0.8 -16.3 3.2 2.4 -16.0 
1972 0.1 -5.3 -4.3 -9.1 -1.4 -8.9 3.4 -22.2 -16.5 -10.7 
1973 71.4 48.6 40.8 37.7 34.0 42.4 17.9 -10.2 -13.7 -14.7 
1974 169.8 146.4 142.4 103.1 85.0 84.5 97.8 84.4 85.6 74.1 
1975 98.8 71.5 77.8 67.5 82.1 77.6 47.0 44.1 52.2 62.1 
1976 26.1 22.2 9.5 6.2 28.0 16.3 16.2 29.9 16.7 23.6 
1977 73.1 34.5 23.7 62.6 41.9 57.1 27.3 23.6 69.0 57.1 
1978 120.0 56.9 87.1 105.0 64.0 91.9 101.4 91.4 88.8 97.8 
1979 107.6 68.0 70.1 71.0 35.8 73.1 51.3 53.9 56.5 37.5 
1980 156.8 144.7 148.6 101.5 88.3 89.8 96.0 47.3 34.2 54.9 
1981 208.8 193.5 179.4 186.7 142.0 126.9 90.0 127.8 102.3 99.8 
1982 117.3 148.6 161.7 155.6 148.9 125.7 101.9 123.5 111.9 114.2 
 
